New Left Review I/186, March-April 1991

Ervand Abrahamian

Khomeini: Fundamentalist or Populist?

‘How did Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini become an Imam? Much like the Holy Prophet Abraham. He carried out God’s Will, smashed idols, was willing to sacrifice his own son, rose up against tyrants, and led the mostazafin [oppressed] against their mostakberin [oppressors].’

Iranian Parliamentary Deputy, Kayhan-e Hava’i, 21 June 1989

The slippery term ‘fundamentalist’ has been thrown at Khomeini so often, from so many different directions, that it has stuck. [*] For conservatives, the label evokes xenophobia, militancy and radicalism. For liberals, it means extremism, fanaticism and traditionalism. For radicals, it conjures up the image of theological obscurantism, political atavism, and the rejection of science, history, modernity, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution. For Orientalists—who still dominate Middle East studies—it reinforces their underlying presumption that the Muslim world is intrinsically unchanging, irrational, backward-looking, and incapable of freeing itself from its early history. The term has been used so often in the West that Khomeini’s disciples in Iran, finding no Persian or Arabic equivalent, but flattered by its implications, have coined a new word, bonyadgarayan, by translating literally into Persian the English word fundamental-ist. This is ironic considering that the same disciples relish denouncing their opponents as eltegari (eclectic) and gharbzadeh (contaminated with Western diseases).

‘Fundamentalism’: A Persistent Misnomer

Even though the word ‘fundamentalist’ has gained wide currency, I would like to argue that the transference of a term invented by Protestants in early twentieth-century America to a political movement in the contemporary Middle East is not only confusing and misleading, but also downright wrong. It is so for a number of reasons.

First, if fundamentalism means the conviction that one’s scriptural text is free of human errors, then all Muslim believers would have to be considered fundamentalists; for, after all, it is an essential article of Islam that the entire Koran is the absolute Word of God.

Second, if the term implies that the believer can grasp the true meaning of the religion by going directly to the essential text, bypassing the clergy (ulama), then Khomeini was by no means a fundamentalist. As a senior member of the Usuli School of Shiism, he opposed the Akhbari dissenters of the previous centuries who had argued that believers could understand Islam by relying mainly on the Koran. Khomeini, on the contrary, insisted that the Koran was too complex for the vast majority, and that even the Archangel Gabriel, who had brought the Koran to Mohammed, had not been able to understand the ‘inner meanings’ of what he conveyed. Khomeini frequently argued that these ‘inner layers’ could only be grasped by those who were familiar with Arabic, knew the teachings of the Twelve Shia Imams, had studied the works of the clerical scholars throughout the centuries, and, most nebulous of all, had somehow been endowed with irfan (gnostic knowledge). [1] Only the most learned clerics—and then only a few selected ones among them—could comprehend the inner essence of Islam.

Third, if fundamentalism means striving to re-create a Golden Age, then again Khomeini was not a straightforward fundamentalist. It is true that in his earlier years he implied that Mohammed’s Mecca and Imam Ali’s Caliphate were the models to replicate. But it is also true that in later years he often argued that even the Prophet and the First Imam had not been able to surmount the horrendous problems of their contemporary societies. [2] What is more, in the euphoria of revolutionary success, he boasted that the Islamic Republic of Iran had surpassed all previous Muslim societies, including that of the Prophet, in implementing true religion ‘in all spheres of life, particularly in the material and the spiritual spheres’. [3] In short, the Islamic Republic of Iran had supplanted Mohammed’s Mecca and Imam All’s Caliphate as the Muslim Golden Age. To some this smacks of blasphemy.

Fourth, if fundamentalism implies the rejection of the modern nation-state and with it the contemporary state boundaries, then Khomeini does not qualify, as Sami Zubaida has shown. [4] True, he at times claimed that imperialism had divided the Islamic Community (Ummat) into rival states and nations. It is also true that his early writings implicitly accept the existence of the territorial nation-state; and his later writings make this assumption more explicit. He increasingly spoke of Mehan-e Iran (Iranian Fatherland), Mellat-e Iran (Iranian Nation), Irandoust (Iranian Patriot), and Mardom-e Sharif-e Iran (Honourable People of Iran). He even disqualified one of his staunch supporters from entering the 1980 presidential elections on the grounds that his father had been born in Afghanistan. The nationalistic language, together with the use of exclusively Shia symbols and imagery, helps explain why the Khomeinists have failed to export the revolution outside Iran.

Fifth, if fundamentalism suggests the strict implementation of the laws, as well as the institutions, found in the basic texts, then Khomeini yet again was no fundamentalist. Many of Khomeini’s most rigid laws, including those concerning the veil, are found not in the Koran but in later traditions—some of them with non-Muslim antecedents. Similarly, the whole constitutional structure of the Islamic Republic was modelled less on the early Caliphate than on De Gaulle’s Fifth Republic. When parliamentary deputies began to question the Islamic precedents of some tax laws, Hojjat al-Islam Rafsanjani, one of Khomeini’s closest disciples, retorted in exasperation: ‘Where in Islamic history do you find Parliament, President, Prime Minister, and Cabinet of Ministers. In fact, eighty per cent of what we now do has no precedent in Islamic history.’ [5] Khomeini’s break with tradition is glaringly obvious in the realm closest to his own heart—that of Islamic law. Before the revolution, he categorically insisted that the shari’a (sacred law) could be implemented only if the religious judges (fuqaha) were entirely free of all state intervention, especially of the cumbersome judicial-review process. [6] After the revolution, he found it expedient to retain a large centrally controlled judicial structure, including an elaborate review process, in order both to provide some semblance of uniformity and to retain some control over local judges. [7]

Sixth, if fundamentalism means a dogmatic adherence to tradition and rejection of modern society, then Khomeini does not qualify. He frequently stressed that Muslims needed to import such essentials as technology, industrial plants and modern civilization (tamaddon-e jadid). His closest disciples often mocked the ‘traditionalists’ (sunnati) for being ‘old-fashioned’ (kohani). They accused them of obsession with ritual purity; preventing their daughters from going to school; insisting that young girls should always be veiled, even when no men were present; denouncing such intellectual pursuits as art, music and chess-playing; and, worst of all, refusing to take advantage of newspapers, electricity, cars, telephones, radios, planes and televisions. [8] In the words of Hojjat al-Islam Hojjati-Kermani, another Khomeini disciple: ‘These traditionalists should be labelled reactionary (ertejayi), for they want us to return to the age of the donkey. What we need is not the worship of the past, but a genuine renasans [literal transliteration of the word ‘Renaissance’].’ [9] The concepts, not to mention the terminology, make mockery of the claim that Khomeinism is merely another recurrence of the old traditionalist ‘epidemic’ that has plagued Islam from its very early days. [10]

Seventh, the term ‘fundamentalism’, because of its origins in early twentieth-century American Protestantism, has distinct conservative political connotations. American fundamentalists, reacting against their contemporary ‘social gospel’ preachers, argued that the goal of true religion was not to change society but to ‘save souls’ by preserving the literal interpretation of the Bible—especially on such doctrinal issues as Darwinism, Judgement Day, and the Virgin Birth. Khomeinism, on the other hand, while by no means oblivious to doctrinal matters, is primarily concerned with sociopolitical issues—with revolution against the royalist elite, expulsion of Western imperialists, and mobilization of what it terms the mostazafin (oppressed) against the mostakberin (oppressors). In fact, Khomeini succeeded in gaining power mainly because his public pronouncements carefully avoided esoteric doctrinal issues. Instead, they hammered away at the regime on its most visible political, social and economic shortcomings.

Finally, the term ‘fundamentalist’ conjures up the image of inflexible orthodoxy, traditional authenticity, and rejection of intellectual innovations, especially foreign ones. Khomeini, however, despite his own denials, was in the political arena highly flexible, remarkably innovative, and equally cavalier towards hallowed traditions. He is important precisely because he discarded many Shia concepts. He borrowed words and slogans, as well as ideas, from the non-Muslim world. And, in doing so, he formulated a brand new Shia interpretation of state and society. The final product has less in common with conventional fundamentalism than with Third World populism, especially in Latin America. Of course, Khomeinism—unlike many other populisms—also contains a religious dimension. But this is not so much because it is a fundamentalist movement as because Shia Islam is part and parcel of the popular culture of Iran—especially of the bazaar middle class. [11]

The Meaning of Populism

The term ‘populism’ needs some elaboration. By it I mean a predominantly middle-class movement that mobilizes the lower classes, especially the urban poor, with radical rhetoric against imperialism, foreign capitalism and the political establishment. In mobilizing the ‘common man’, populist movements use charismatic figures as well as symbols, imagery and language that have potent value in their popular culture. They promise to raise drastically the standard of living and make their country fully independent of the West. Even more important, in attacking the status quo with radical rhetoric, they intentionally stop short of threatening the petty bourgeoisie and the whole principle of private property. Thus populist movements inevitably emphasize the importance not of economic-social revolution, but of cultural, national and political reconstruction.

This definition applies best to mass movements in Latin America, especially those led by Peron in Argentina and Vargas in Brazil. It excludes, however, three types of movement that have often been mislabelled as populist: the Russian Narodniks; the European Fascists, particularly in Germany and Italy; and the African struggles for national independence. It excludes the Narodniks for the simple reason that they were revolutionary socialists who had no respect for private property, and sought nothing less than the root-and-branch destruction of the existing class structure. It excludes the Fascists, even though they had much in common with populism, for the less simple reason that they enjoyed some upper-class support (from army officers, large landowners, bankers and industrialists). Moreover, they aimed to depoliticize rather than actively mobilize the lower classes. Fascism pushed the masses out of politics; populism invites, even incites, them in. The definition also excludes most nationalist movements in Africa on the grounds that they targeted their attacks on the external powers, not on the native elites, and mobilized their publics not through mass politics but through traditionally based clientalist networks. [12]

In defining Khomeini as a populist rather than a fundamentalist I do not wish to deny the sincerity of his religious convictions, nor the added authority that accrued to him as a clerical leader. To this extent we should recognize Khomeinism as a specifically religious variant of populism, in contrast to the more purely secular appeal of Peron, Vargas or even Saddam Hussein—despite the latter’s new-found piety. But this does not mean that Khomeini should be seen mainly as a religious figure; nor does it justify any underestimation of the powerful secular themes he articulated. Such diverse figures as Savonarola, Gandhi, and the Puritans in the English Revolution possessed spiritual convictions and religious authority yet undeniably advanced secular causes, and their impact is invariably assessed more in secular than in religious terms. Khomeini’s populism, while embedded in Shiism, is significant precisely because it managed drastically to reinterpret the basic political tenets of Shiism—especially in its attitudes towards state and society.

Shia Theories of the State

Throughout the Middle Ages the Shia ulama, unlike their Sunni counterpart, failed to develop a consistent theory of the state. The Sunnis, recognizing the Ummayid and Abbasid Caliphs as the Prophet’s legitimate successors, accepted the reigning monarchs as lawful as long as these rulers did not blatantly violate Islamic norms. Had not the Prophet himself said: ‘My Community will never agree on an error’? Had not the Koran commanded: ‘Obey God, His Prophet, and those among you who have authority’? Had not al-Ghazzali, the prominent mediaeval philosopher, argued that rulers were appointed by God, that rebellion against them was tantamount to rejection of the Almighty, and that forty years of tyranny were better than one single day of anarchy? Following these leads, the Sunni clergy associated political obedience with religious duty, and civil disobedience with religious heresy.

The Shia ulama, however, were ambivalent and divided. They rejected the early dynasties, arguing that the Prophet’s true heirs should have been the Twelve Imams. This line began with Ali, the Prophet’s first cousin, adopted son, son-in-law, and, according to them, designated successor as the Imam (Leader) of the Muslim Community (Ummat). It went through Ali’s son Hosayn, the Third Imam, who had rebelled against the Yazid, the usurper Caliph, and had been martyred at the battle of Karbala forty-eight years after the Prophet’s death. It ended with the last of their direct male descendants, the Twelfth Imam, also known as the Mahdi (Messiah), the Imam-e Montazar (Expected Leader), and the Sahab-e Zaman (Lord of the Age). He had supposedly gone into hiding a century after Hosayn’s martyrdom, but would appear at some future time when the world was rampant with corruption and oppression to prepare the way for Judgement Day.

Although the Shia ulama agreed that only the Hidden Imam had full legitimacy, they differed sharply among themselves regarding the existing states—even the Shia ones. Some argued that since all rulers were in essence usurpers, true believers should shun the authorities like the plague. They should decline government office; avoid Friday prayers, where thanks were invariably offered to the monarch; take disputes to their own legal experts rather than to the state judges; practice taqiyya (dissimulation) when in danger; and pay khoms, the main legitimate tax, not to the government but to their clerical leaders, as their Nayeb-e Imam (Imam’s Deputy).

Others, however, argued that one should grudgingly accept the state. They claimed that bad government was better than no government; that many Imams had categorically opposed armed insurrections; and that Imam Ali, in his often quoted Nahj al-Balaqhah (Way of Eloquence), had warned of the dangers of social chaos. They also pointed out that Jafar Sadeq, the Sixth and most scholarly of the Imams, had stressed ‘if your ruler is bad, ask God to reform him, but if he is good, ask God to prolong his life’.

Yet others wholeheartedly accepted the state—especially after 1501 when the Safavids established a Shia dynasty in Iran. Following the example of Majlisi, the well-known Safavid theologian, they argued that shahs were Shadows of God on Earth; that obedience was their divine right; that political dissension led directly to eternal damnation; that without monarchy there would inevitably be social anarchy; that kings and clerics were complementary pillars of the state and both shared the Imam’s mantle. In making such arguments, these clerics often quoted not only al-Ghazzali, but also the famous Koranic commandment ‘obey those among you who have authority’. In this form the Shia concept of the state came to be the mirror image of that of the conservative Sunnis.

It is significant that in all these discussions, which lasted, on and off, for some eleven centuries, no Shia writer even explicitly contended that monarchies per se were illegitimate or that the senior ulama had the authority to control the state. [13] Most viewed the clergy’s main responsibilities, which they referred to as the velayat-e faqih, as being predominantly apolitical. The ulama were to study the law (fiqh) based on the Koran, the Prophet’s Traditions (Hadiths), and the teachings of the Twelve Imams. They were also to use reason to update these laws; issue pronouncements (fatwa) on new concerns; adjudicate in legal disputes; and distribute the khoms contributions to worthy widows, orphans, seminary students, and indigent sayyids (presumed male descendants of the Prophet). In fact, for most the term velayat-e faqih meant no more than the legal guardianship of the senior clerics over those deemed incapable of looking after their own interests—minors, widows and the insane. For a few, it also meant that the senior clerics had the authority to enter the political fray, but only temporarily and if the ruler was clearly endangering the whole community. In 1891 Mohammad Hasan Shirazi, one of the first to be generally recognized as the paramount senior cleric of his time—the marja’-e taqlid (source of emulation)—issued a fatwa against the government for selling a major tobacco concession to a British entrepreneur. But, in doing so, he stressed that he was merely opposed to bad court advisers and that he would withdraw from politics once the hated agreement was cancelled. Similarly in 1906 when the leading clerics—who now used the new title ayatollah (God’s symbol)—participated in the constitutional revolution, their aim was neither to overthrow the monarchy nor to establish a theocracy, but at most to set up a supervisory committee of senior clerics to ensure that legislation passed by the elected parliament conformed to the shari’a.

Khomeini’s New Concept of the State

Khomeini began his political career with typical Shia ambiguities. His first political tract, written in 1943 and entitled Kashf al-Asrar, denounced the recently deposed Reza Shah for a host of secular sins—for closing down seminaries, expropriating religious endowments, propagating anti-clerical sentiments, replacing shari’a courts with state ones, permitting the consumption of alcoholic beverages and the playing of ‘sensuous music’, forcing men to wear Western-style hats, establishing coeducational schools, and banning the long veil (chador) thus ‘forcing women to go naked into the streets’. [14] But he explicitly disavowed wanting to overthrow the throne and repeatedly reaffirmed his allegiance to monarchies in general and to ‘good monarchs’ in particular. He argued that the Shia clergy had never opposed the state as such, even when governments had issued anti-Islamic orders, for a ‘bad order was better than no order at all’. [15] He emphasized that no cleric had ever claimed the right to rule; that many, including Majlisi, had supported their rulers, participated in government, and encouraged the faithful to pay taxes and cooperate with state authorities. If, on rare occasions, they had criticized their rulers, it was because they opposed specific monarchs, not the ‘whole foundations of monarchy’. He also reminded his readers that Imam Ali had accepted ‘even the worst of the early Caliphs’. [16]

The most Khomeini asked in Kashf al-Asrar was that the monarch should respect the clergy, recruit more of them into parliament, and ensure that state laws conformed to the shari’a. The shari’a, he argued, had prescriptions to remedy all social ills; and the ulama, particularly the fuqaha (religious jurists), being specialists on the shari’a, were like highly trained doctors who knew how to cure these social maladies. [17]

Khomeini retained these traditional attitudes towards the state throughout the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. Even during the bloody 1963 Uprising when he emerged as the most vocal cleric opposed to Mohammed Reza Shah, he called neither for a revolution nor for overthrow of the monarchy. Rather he castigated the Shah for secular and anti-national transgressions: for becoming an unwitting tool of the ‘imperialist–Jewish conspiracy’; permitting women to vote in local elections; allowing citizens to take oaths on ‘any sacred book’; smearing clerics as ‘black reactionaries’; trampling over the constitutional laws; supposedly giving high offices to Bahais; siding with Israel against the Arabs, thus causing ‘our Sunni brothers to think that we Shias are really Jews’; and ‘capitulating’ to the almighty dollar by exempting American military personnel from Iranian laws. [18] ‘An American cook,’ he argued, ‘can now assassinate one of our religious leaders or run over the Shah without having to worry about our laws.’

These castigations were made more in the manner of a warning than of a revolutionary threat. Khomeini again reminded his audience that Imam Ali had accepted the Caliphs. [19] He expressed ‘deep sorrow’ that the Shah continued to mistreat the ulama, whom he described as the ‘true guardians of Islam’. [20] He stressed that he wanted the young Shah to reform so that he would not go the same way as his father, namely into exile. [21] And even in 1965, after his own deportation, he continued to accept monarchies as legitimate. In one of his few proclamations issued in the mid 1960s, he exhorted Muslim monarchs to work together with Muslim republics against Israel. [22]

Khomeini did not develop a new Shia concept of state or society until very late into the 1960s. It is not clear what intellectual influences brought about this change. Khomeini himself was reluctant to admit formulating new notions. He was not in the habit of footnoting his works and giving credit where credit was due—especially if the sources were foreign ones. What is more, in the crucial years of 1965–70 when he was developing these new ideas, he was conspicuously silent, rarely giving interviews, sermons and pronouncements.

We can therefore only speculate as to the origins of the new ideas. These may have come from Shia theologians in Iraq, where he lived after 1964; these theologians had been deeply influenced by the local Communist Party, which for years had had strong roots among Iraqi Shias. Or they may have originated from Khomeini’s younger Iranian students, more and more of whom now came from the lower middle class. Or again they may have come from the Iranian intelligentsia, especially the Mojahedin, the Confederation of Iranian Students in Exile, and the radical Muslim pamphleteer Ali Shariati. This radical intelligentsia had been influenced by contemporary Marxism, especially Castroism and Maoism.

If what caused Khomeini to change his views is debatable, the actual changes are not. He broke his long silence in early 1970 by giving a series of lectures attacking, without naming them, senior clerics who, he claimed, used the seminaries as a refuge from political realities. These lectures, originally given in Arabic, were soon published in Persian under the title of Velayat-e Faqih: Hokumat-e Islami (The Jurist’s Guardianship: Islamic Government). In these lectures, Khomeini declared in no uncertain terms that Islam was inherently incompatible with all forms of monarchy (saltanat). He argued that monarchies were ‘pagan’ institutions which the ‘despotic’ Ummayids had taken over from the ancient Roman and Iranian Empires; that the old Prophets, particularly Moses, had opposed the Pharaohs because they judged such titles to be immoral; and that Imam Hosayn had raised the banner of revolt in Karbala because he had opposed hereditary kingship on principle. He also argued that monarchies were tantamount to taqhut (false gods), shirk (idolatry), and fasad-e al-arz (sowing corruption on earth). What is more, Khomeini continued, the Prophet Mohammed had declared malek al-muluk to be the most hated of all titles in the eyes of the Almighty—Khomeini interpreted this title to be the same as ‘Shah of Shahs’.

Muslims, Khomeini insisted, have the sacred duty to oppose monarchs. They must not collaborate with them, nor have recourse to their institutions, nor pay for their bureaucracies, nor practise dissimulation to protect themselves. On the contrary, they have the responsibility to rise up (qiyam) against them. Most kings, he added, have been crooks, oppressors and mass murderers. In later years, he went further to insist that all monarchs without exception—including Shah Abbas, the famous Safavid king, as well as Anushirvan, the ancient ruler whom Iranians usually refer to as ‘the Just’—had been thoroughly unjust. [23]

In denouncing kingship, Khomeini put forward various reasons why the ulama, especially the fuqaha, had the divine right to rule. [24] He interpreted the Koranic commandment ‘Obey those among you who have authority’ to mean that Muslims had to follow their fuqaha. For the Prophet had handed down to the Imams all-encompassing authority—the right to lead and supervise the community as well as to interpret and implement the shari’a. And the Twelfth Imam, in going into hiding, had passed on this all-encompassing authority to the fuqaha. Had not Imam Ali ordered ‘all believers to obey his successors’? Had he not explained that by ‘successors’ he meant ‘those who transmit my statements and my traditions, and teach them to the people’? Had not the Seventh Imam praised the fuqaha as ‘the fortress of Islam’? Had not the Twelfth Imam instructed the future generations to obey those who knew his teachings, since they were his representatives among the people in the same way as he was God’s representative among all believers? Had not the Prophet himself declared that knowledge led to paradise and that ‘men of knowledge’ had as much superiority over ordinary mortals as the full moon had over the stars? Had not God created the shari’a to guide the community, the state to implement the shari’a, and the fuqaha to understand and implement the shari’a? The fuqaha, Khomeini concluded, have the ‘same authority’ as the Prophet and the Imams; and the term velayat-e faqih meant ‘jurisdiction over believers’, all of whom are in dire need of the shari’a. In other words, disobedience to the fuqaha was disobedience to God. [25]

In presenting his Velayat-e Faqih, Khomeini warned listeners that this ‘true Islam’ might sound ‘strange’. [26] After all, false ideas spread over the centuries by a conspiracy of Jews, imperialists and royalists had taken a heavy toll. Important hadiths had been misinterpreted. The word faqih had been left out of important quotations. What is more, government officials had systematically spread the notion that clerics should be seen within seminary confines and not heard in the arena of controversial politics. So much so that the crucial term velayat-e faqih had been distorted to refer only to the ulama’s guardianship over widows, orphans and the mentally ill. Despite these shortcomings, Khomeini reminded his audience, clerics had risen to the occasion in times of crisis to protect Islam and Iran from imperialism and royal despotism—in the Tobacco Crisis of 1891, in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, in the dark days of Reza Shah, and, of course, in the 1963 Uprising against Mohammed Reza Shah. In these crises, Khomeini stressed, the ulama as a whole kept alive ‘national consciousness’ and stood firm as the ‘fortress of independence’ against imperialism, secularism, and other ‘isms’ imported from the West. [27]

Khomeini’s Transformed View of Society

Khomeini’s attitudes towards society developed along parallel lines. In his pre-1970 writings, he tended to accept the traditional notions of society as sketched out in the Nahj al-Balaqhah, in the teachings of the Shia ulama, and in the ‘Mirror of Princes’ literature produced in the Safavid and Qajar courts. He accepted the conventional paternalistic presumptions that God had created both private property and society; that society should be formed of a hierarchy of mutually dependent strata (qeshre); that the poor should accept their lot and not envy the rich; and that the rich should thank God, avoid conspicuous consumption, and give generously to the poor. He often stressed that the shari’a protected wealth as a ‘divine gift’, and that the state had the sacred duty to keep a healthy balance between the various strata, preventing each from transgressing the others. It is significant that in these early writings he rarely used the word tabaqeh (class), and scrupulously avoided the term enqelab (revolution) even though he did occasionally call for a qiyam (uprising). For the conventional ulama, enqelab was a derogatory term connoting anarchy, class hatred, and the world turned upside down.

In his post-1970 writings, however, Khomeini depicted society as sharply divided into two warring classes (tabaqat): the mostazafin (oppressed) against the mostakberin (oppressors); the foqara (poor) against the sarvatmandan (rich); the mellat-e mostazaf (oppressed nation) against the hokumat-e shaytan (Satan’s government); the zaqhehneshinha (shantytown dwellers) against the kakh-neshinha (palace dwellers); the tabaqeh-e payin (lower class) against the tabaqeh-e bala (upper class); and the tabaqeh-e mostamdan (needy class) against the tabaqeh-e a’yan (aristocratic class).

The key to this transformation can be seen in the way Khomeini used the word mostazafin. He rarely used it in his early writings. When he did it was in the Koranic sense of the ‘humble’ and passive ‘meek’ believers—especially orphans, widows and the mentally ill. But in the 1970s he used it in almost every single sermon, speech and proclamation. What is more, he used it to depict the angry poor, the ‘exploited’ people, and the ‘downtrodden masses’. It should also be noted that after the revolution he gradually broadened the term to bring in not only the propertied middle class but even members of the wealthy elite who actively supported the new order. Thus by the mid 1980s, the term mostazafin became a broad subjective category bearing striking resemblance to the Jacobin sans culottes, Sukharno’s Manrhaen (commonfolk), Peron’s descamisados (coatless ones), and Vargas’s trabalhadores (urban workers).

In his public pronouncements of the 1970s, Khomeini rarely mentioned doctrinal issues and the concept of valayat-e faqih. Instead he targeted the Shah on sensitive socioeconomic issues. He accused him of widening the gap between rich and poor; favouring cronies, relatives, senior officials, and other kravatis (tie wearers); wasting oil resources on the ever-expanding army and bureaucracy; setting up phoney assembly plants instead of real manufacturing industries; starving the countryside of essential services, including clinics, schools, electricity and public baths; failing to give land to the landless peasantry; condemning the working class to a life of poverty, misery and drudgery; creating huge shantytowns and neglecting low-income housing; bankrupting the bazaars by refusing to protect them from foreign competition and the super-rich entrepreneurs; and compounding social problems by failing to combat rising crime, alcoholism, prostitution and drug addiction. [28]

At the same time, Khomeini continued to denounce the Shah for helping the usa and Israel against the Arab World, for trampling over political liberties, for making the country increasingly dependent on the West, and for using cultural imperialism to undermine Islam and Iran. Islam was endangered, Khomeini constantly warned, from outside by imperialism and Zionism, and from inside by ‘fifth columnists’ (sotun-e panjom)—monarchists, liberals, secularists and leftists.

In these denunciations, Khomeini resorted to populistic rhetoric. This rhetoric, at first glance, sounds highly radical, but more careful scrutiny shows it to be extremely vague on specifics and silent on the question of private property. Many of Khomeini’s catchphrases were adopted as demonstration slogans during and after the revolution. They included such dictums as: [29]

Islam belongs to the mostazafin, not to the mostakberin.

Islam is for equality and social justice.

Islam represents the shantytown dwellers, not the palace dwellers.

Islam will eliminate class differences.

We are for Islam, not for capitalism and feudalism.

Islam originates from the masses, not from the rich.

In a truly Islamic society, there will be no shantytowns.

In a truly Islamic society, there will be no landless peasants.

The duty of the ulama is to liberate the hungry from the clutches of the rich.

Islam is not the opiate of the masses.

The poor were for the Prophet, the rich were against Him.

The poor die for the Islamic Revolution, the rich plotted against it.

The martyrs of the Islamic Revolution were all members of lower classes—peasants, industrial workers, and bazaar merchants and tradesmen.

Mostazafin of the world unite.

The mostazafin of the world should create a Party of the Moztazafin.

The problems of the East come from the West—especially from American imperialism.

Neither West nor East, but Islam.

The oppressed nations of the world should unite against their imperialist oppressors.

Some of Khomeini’s most radical-sounding pronouncements came on May Days—an occasion celebrated by the Islamic Republic. In 1979 he declared that every day should be considered Workers’ Day, as labour is the source of all things, even of heaven and hell. [30] In 1980 he described workers as the ‘beacon of humanity’, praised them as the ‘most valuable class in society’, and exhorted them to continue standing firm against imperialism. [31] Similarly, in 1982 he announced that the ‘sweat of the worker was as precious as the blood of the martyr’ and that ‘a day in the life of a worker was more valuable than the whole life of a capitalist exploiter.’ [32]

Khomeini, moreover, reinterpreted early Islamic history to reinforce these populistic notions. He argued that contrary to traditional hearsay the Prophet had been a humble shepherd, not a successful businessman; that Imam Ali had been a penniless water carrier, not a prosperous merchant; that many of the early prophets had been simple labourers who had looked forward to the day when the mostazafin would become the mostakberin and the mostakberin would become the mostazafin. He also argued that most of the Shia ulama, including the grand ayatollahs, had originated from the common people, lived like ‘humble folk’, and died with few worldly possessions. [33]

Khomeini’s populist rhetoric reached a crescendo in 1979. As the old regime was collapsing, he incorporated into his political vocabulary two words he had hitherto scrupulously avoided—enqelab (revolution) and jomhuri (republic). He now argued that the Islamic revolution would pave the way for an Islamic republic, which, in turn, would hasten the establishment of a truly Islamic society. This, being the exact opposite of Pahlavi Iran, would be free of want, hunger, unemployment, slums, inequality, illiteracy, crime, alcoholism, prostitution, drugs, nepotism, corruption, exploitation, foreign domination—and, yes, even of bureaucratic red tape. Instead it would be a genuinely independent community based on equality, fraternity and social justice.

In promising utopia, Khomeini managed to discard, nevertheless, two other important tenets of traditional Shiism. For centuries, Shias had looked back on Mohammed’s Mecca and Imam Hosayn’s Caliphate as the Golden Age of Islam. Khomeini now declared that revolutionary Iran had already surpassed these early societies and their insoluble problems. For centuries, Shias had believed that the Mahdi would return when the world was overflowing with injustice and tyranny. Khomeini now argued that He would reappear when Muslims had returned to Islam, created a just society, and exported their revolution to other countries. [34] The traditional quietist tenet had been turned inside out.

The Islamic Republic’s Constitution

Khomeini’s populism can also be seen in the two most important texts published since the revolution: the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, and his own Last Will and Testament. The Constitution was drafted in 1979–80 by an Assembly of Religious Experts (Majles-e Khobreqan)—most of whom were Khomeini’s disciples. The final testament was drawn up in 1983, revised in the mid 1980s, and published immediately after his death in 1989.

At first glance, the text of the Constitution with its one hundred and seventy-five clauses reads like a cumbersome ‘fundamentalist’ document. [35] It begins with the declaration that the Islamic Republic is based on the ‘principal faiths’ of the Justice of God; the existence of One God and Submission to His Will; the Divine Message and its fundamental role in all human laws; and the concept of the resurrection and its ‘role in human evolution’. It also declares that the constitutional clauses for the leadership were to endure until the Mahdi, the Lord of the Age, reappeared on Earth. This, however, did not prevent the Assembly of Experts from drastically revamping these same clauses ten years later and even introducing a theological exam for entry to this exclusive club in order to weed out the more radical clerics.

A closer look, however, shows that the text of the Constitution, not to mention its pretext, subtext and context, is highly non-fundamentalist. Its central structure was taken straight from the French Fifth Republic, founded on Montesquieu’s separation of powers. It divided the state into the Executive, headed by the President supervizing a highly centralized state; the Judiciary, with powers to appoint district judges and review their verdicts; and the national Parliament, elected through universal adult suffrage. For years Khomeini had argued that women’s suffrage was anti-Islamic. He now argued that to deprive women of the vote was anti-Islamic.

Placed above this conventional Constitution was Khomeini’s new concept of Velayat-e Faqih. Khomeini, described as the Supreme Religious Jurist, was given the authority to dismiss the President, appoint the main military commanders, declare war and peace, and name senior clerics to a Guardian Council whose chief responsibility was to ensure that all laws passed by parliament conformed to the shari’a. The Constitution added that if after Khomeini no supreme faqih emerged, then the leadership would pass to a committee of three or five senior clerics (marja’-e taqlid) elected by the Assembly of Experts.

In fact, after Khomeini’s death no such faqih emerged. And the Assembly of Experts, well aware that the senior jurists distrusted their populism, quickly amended the Constitution, dropping the requirement of marja’-e taqlid, so that Khomeini’s position could be inherited by Hojjat al-Islam Khamanehi. Khamanehi was neither a faqih, nor a marja’-e taqlid, nor at the time even a generally accepted ayatollah. This amendment, while revealing the pragmatic nature of Khomeinism, unwittingly undermined the theological foundations of Khomeini’s Velayat-e Faqih. For, after all, Khomeini had argued that the most senior religious jurists—not just any cleric—were endowed with the right to rule precisely because they had the scholastic expertise on the shari’a that God had created to regulate society.

The Constitution also contained much populist rhetoric. It began with the two controversial terms enqelab (revolution) and jomhuri (republic). It glorified Khomeini not only as the revolution’s leader (rahbar), the republic’s founder, and the most respected of the faqih, but also as an Imam—a title which Iranian Shias had traditionally reserved for the original Twelve Imams. In fact, conservative clerics viewed this use of the title as blasphemous. [36]

The Constitution went on to promise—‘as a legal obligation’—to provide all citizens with pensions, social security, unemployment benefits, disability pay, medical services, and free secondary as well as primary-school education. It further promised to eradicate hoarding, usury, monopolies, unemployment, poverty and social deprivation; provide interest-free loans; utilize science and technology; and ‘plan the economy in such a way that all individuals would have the time and opportunity to enhance their moral and social development, and participate in the leadership and management of the country.’ These clauses seem to have escaped the notice of Western journalists who claim that the Iranian Revolution was carried out in the name of rejecting the material things of this world. [37] The Constitution furthermore promised to make Iran totally independent—culturally, agriculturally and industrially; prevent the economic domination of the country by foreigners; cancel all economic concessions to them; strive for the total unity of all Muslims; and ‘help the mostazafin of the world struggle against their oppressors’.

Despite the radical rhetoric, the Constitution undertook to safeguard private property. It promised to balance the government budget, encourage ‘home ownership’, and respect the predominance of the ‘private sector’ in agriculture, trade, services, and small industries. What is more, it intentionally avoided the socialistic phrase nezam-e towhidi (unitary order), a term which the Mojahedin and other Islamic radicals—as opposed to populists—wanted enshrined into the republic’s Constitution. The limitations of this populism became more clear in 1989 when the new electoral law explicitly barred those without higher degrees from running for parliament. Apparently, only those with higher education were deemed qualified to represent the people.

Khomeini’s Last Will and Testament

Khomeini’s 35-page handwritten will contains a coherent structure, even though it went through major alterations between the time it was written and eventually published. [38] Its prologue hails true Islam as the message of ‘liberation’ and ‘social justice’ not just for Iranians and Muslims but also for the ‘oppressed people of the world, irrespective of nationality and religion’. It also warns that the true message is being constantly distorted by an international conspiracy involving not only Zionists, Communists, Eastern and Western imperialists, but also by Marxists masquerading as Muslims, Western-contaminated liberals, opportunistic clerics, and local tyrants—namely the Saudis in Arabia, King Hassan of Morocco, King Hussein of Jordan, and Saddam Hussein of Iraq.

The actual text has sections addressed to specific groups. It addresses the ulama and the seminaries; the university-educated intelligentsia; the majles deputies; the judiciary; the executive, particularly the cabinet; the armed forces—the regular army as well as the revolutionary guards; the mass media—the radio-television network and the daily newspapers; the opposition in exile, especially the Marxist parties; and last but not least, the bazaars with their shopkeepers, traders and small businessmen. In each section, he warns of the ever-present danger of conspiracies hatched by the superpowers and ‘fifth columnists’.

In addressing the majles, Khomeini stresses that the deputies should continue to come from the ‘middle class and the deprived population’, and not from the ranks of the ‘capitalists, land-grabbers, and the upper class who lust in pleasure and know nothing about hunger, poverty and barefootedness’. In addressing the ministers and civil servants, he reminds them that the revolution had succeeded because of the active participation of the ‘deprived classes’. He also warns that if they lost this support they would follow the Pahlavis into exile. What is more, in addressing the bazaars, he emphasizes that Islam safeguards private property. It encourages private investment in agriculture and industry, provides for a ‘balanced economy in which the private sector is recognized’, and, unlike communism, recognizes the importance of private property in providing ‘social justice’ and turning the ‘wheels of a healthy economy’. He ends his last testament by telling Muslims and the deprived of the world that they should not sit around passively waiting for liberation, but should rise up to overthrow the imperialists and their local lackies—the tyrants, the palace dwellers, and those indulging in conspicuous consumption.

Khomeinism and Populism

Thus Khomeinism, despite its religious dimension, in some ways resembles populism in Latin America. This is not surprising since modern Iran and Latin America have much in common: economic rather than political dependency on the West; informal rather than formal subjection to imperialism; an upper class that included the comprador big bourgeoisie; an anti-imperialist middle class; an industrial working class unorganized by the Left; and a recent influx of rural migrants into the sprawling shantytowns. The results are in many ways similar. Khomeinism—like Latin American populism—is mainly a middle-class movement that mobilizes the masses with radical-sounding rhetoric against the external powers and entrenched classes. But in attacking the establishment, it is careful to respect private property and avoid concrete proposals that would undermine the petty bourgeoisie. These movements have vague aspirations, but no precise programmes. They use the language of class against the ruling elite, but once the old order is swept aside they stress the need for communal solidarity and national unity. They are more interested in changing ‘cultural’ and educational institutions than in overthrowing the modes of production and distribution. They are Janus-faced: revolutionary against the regimes, conservative once the new ones are set up. But it is this revolutionary face that accounts for the support they initially won from the Left—from social democrats and Castroists as well as from Trotskyists, Maoists and Stalinists. Religious fundamentalism would never have won such support.

Khomeinism—like these populisms—sees international ‘plots’ everywhere: among intellectuals, political non-conformists, and ethnic and religious minorities. Dissenters, even on the left, are treated as dangerous ‘fifth columnists’. Khomeini has executed Marxists on the grounds that they are ‘pro-American communists’. These populisms claim to be returning to ‘native roots’, eradicating ‘cosmopolitan ideas’, and charting a non-capitalist and non-communist Third Road towards development. In fact, however, many of their concepts and slogans are borrowed from the outside world—especially from European socialism. These populisms all use mass organizations and plebiscitary politics to mobilize the masses, but at the same time distrust any form of political pluralism, liberalism and grass-roots democracy. All have ambiguous attitudes toward the state. On the one hand, they do not want the government to threaten middle-class property. On the other hand, they want to strengthen their government by extending its reach throughout society and providing social benefits to the urban poor. What is more, these populisms elevate the leader to a demi-god who not only stands way above the people but also embodies their historical roots, future destiny, and revolutionary martyrs. Despite all the talk of the people, power emanates down from the leader, not up from the masses. Despite these similarities, Khomeinism and Latin American populism do have differences. The former spoke predominantly through Shiism, the latter through secular nationalism. The religious origins and inflections of Khomeinism have, in conjunction with its radical secular themes, helped give it resonance in the Islamic world—especially among Shias. It may even be that the varieties of populism articulated within a religious language can appear more radical than the secular forms, since the former derive confidence from their deep rootedness in popular mentalities. It could also be said that the popular mobilizations inspired by Khomeinism were in political terms more ‘revolutionary’ than Peronist and Vargas movements which received their initial impetus when the leaders were already in power.

Since Khomeini’s death, his heirs—Imam Khamenehi and President Rafsanjani—have continued denouncing imperialism, Zionism and ‘exploitative capitalism’ while, at the same time, protecting pettybourgeois property and further toning down their radical rhetoric. They no longer talk of land reform, income redistribution and nationalization of foreign trade. They instead praise business as an ‘honourable profession’, wax eloquent about the religious virtues of the bazaar, criticize ‘extremists’ for their ‘infantile ideas’, and differentiate between Islam which sanctifies private property and communism which advocates the ‘sharing of everything, including wives and homosexuals’. They have weeded out radicals from positions of power. They talk less about social justice and the rights of the shantytown poor, and more about productivity, privatization, business incentives, managerial skills and free-market mechanisms. Their answer to the horrendous unemployment problem is trickle-down economics worthy of the Chicago School. This ‘pragmatism’ extends to international affairs. The regime has wooed foreign capital and Western aid—particularly from the World Bank. It has normalized relations with Europe, including Britain, and with the Gulf states. It has probably encouraged Shia groups in Lebanon to release hostages. It has discouraged the independence movement in Soviet Azerbaijan. What is more, in the current crisis in Iraq, Iran—despite ties to Saddam Hussein’s Shia opposition—appears to be motivated less by the ambition of exporting the revolution than by the fear that the Americans and the British, together with the Saudis and the Egyptians, might install a client regime in Baghdad. The Khomeinists, like other populists, have been able to discard radical rhetoric in favour of pragmatic politics without contradicting their vague ideology—but, of course, at the risk of undermining their wide popular support.

[*] A shorter version of this article was first presented at a Conference on Comparative Religious Fundamentalism held in City College, City University of New York, in May 1988.

[1] R. Khomeini, Kashf al-Asrar (Secrets Unveiled), n.p., Teheran 1943, p. 322. See also R. Khomeini, Speech, Jomhuri-ye Islami, 22–31 December 1979; Ettela’at, 18 November 1987; Ettela’at, 25 August 1986; Kayhan-e Hava’i, 18 November 1987. For his most overtly mystical writings, see R. Khomeini, Letter to Fatemeh Tabatabai, Kayhan-e Hava’i, 23–30 May 1990. For a brief analysis of the influence of mysticism on Khomeini, see N. Pakdaman, ‘Until Death’, Cheshmandaz, no. 6, Summer 1989, pp. 1–13.

[2] R. Khomeini, Speech, Ettela’at, 28 December 1979; Kayhan-e Hava’i, 9 May 1984.

[3] R. Khomeini, Speech, Iran Times, 4 December 1982.

[4] S. Zubaida, Islam, the People, and the State, London 1989, pp. 1–37.

[5] Cited by S. Bakhash, ‘Islam and Social Justice in Iran’, in M. Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Resistance, and Revolution, Colorado 1987, p. 113.

[6] R. Khomeini, Velayat-e Faqih: Hokumat-e Islami (The Jurist’s Guardianship: Islamic Government), n.p., Teheran, 1978, pp. 13–14.

[7] H. Rafsanjani, Speech, Kayhan-e Hava’i, 20 December 1987.

[8] M. Hojjati-Kermani, ‘The Jurisprudent and Modern Civilization’, Ettela’at, 4 November–5 December 1988.

[9] Ibid.

[10] S. Arjomand, ‘Traditionalism in Twentieth-century Iran,’ in S. Arjomand, ed., From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam, Albany 1984, pp. 195–232.

[11] For links between the bazaars and Shiism, see R. Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, New York 1985, p. 345.

[12] For discussions of the term ‘political populism’, see: N. Mouzelis, ‘On the Concept of Populism’, Politics and Society, vol. 14, no. 3. 1985, pp. 329–48; G. Ionescu and E. Gellner, eds., Populism, London 1969; A. Hennessy, ‘Fascism and Populism in Latin America’, in W. Laqueur, ed., Fascism: A Reader’s Guide, Los Angeles 1978, pp. 255–96; M. Canovan, Populism, London 1981; E. Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, London 1977; M. Conniff, ed., Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective, Albuquerque 1982; G. Germani, Authoritarianism, Fascism, and National Populism, New Brunswick 1978; and T. Di Tella, ‘Populism and Reform in Latin America’, in C. Veliz, Obstacles to Change in Latin America, New York 1965, pp. 47–73.

[13] One early nineteenth-century cleric, Ahmad Naraqi, made implicit claims that the clergy had authority over the shahs. But he did not define this authority, nor did he make explicit political claims. See H. Dabashi, ‘Early Propagation of Wilayat-i Faqih’, in H. Nasr, H. Dabashi and V. Nasr, eds., Expectations of the Millennium, Albany 1989, pp. 288–300.

[14] Khomeini, Kashf al-Asrar, pp. 1–66.

[15] Ibid., pp. 185–8.

[16] Ibid., p. 226.

[17] Ibid., p. 195.

[18] For Khomeini’s speeches and proclamations in these years, especially 1962–64, see H. Ruhani, Nahzat-e Imam Khomeini (Imam Khomeini’s Movement), Volume 1, Teheran 1984, pp. 142–735; Front for the Liberation of the Iranian People (jama), Khomeini va Jonbesh (Khomeini and the Movement), n.p., 1973), pp. 1–35.

[19] Ruhani, Volume 1, p. 195.

[20] Ibid., p. 198.

[21] Ibid., p. 458.

[22] Ruhani, Volume ii, p. 159.

[23] R. Khomeini, Speech, Ettelaat, 2 December 1985.

[24] Khomeini, Velayat-e Faqih, pp. 76–127.

[25] Ibid., p. 106.

[26] Ibid., p. 85.

[27] R. Khomeini, speech, Ettela’at, 16 June 1981. See also Ettela’at, 10 January 1981; and Kayhan-e Hava’i, 1 March 1989.

[28] For Khomeini’s speeches on these issues, see Ruhani, Volume i; jama, Khabarnameh, 1972–79; and Payam-e Mojahed, 1972–78.

[29] For the use of such slogans, see Anon., ‘The Oppressors and the Oppressed’, Ettela’at, 15 February–23 April 1983. See also Tudeh Party, Hezb-e Tudeh-e Iran az Khatte Imam Poshtebani Mekonad (The Tudeh Party of Iran Supports Imam Khomeini’s Line), Teheran 1979, pp. 1–32.

[30] R. Khomeini, May Day Speech, Ettela’at, 2 May 1979.

[31] R. Khomeini, May Day Speech, Ettela’at, 3 May 1980.

[32] R. Khomeini, May Day Speech, Iran Times, 2 May 1982.

[33] R. Khomeini, Speech, Iran Times, 27 May 1983.

[34] R. Khomeini, Speech, Ettela’at, 13 April 1988; Iran Times, 27 March 1982.

[35] For the complete text of the Constitution, see Iran Times, 30 November 1979. For later revisions, see Kayhan-e Hava’i, 19 June 1989.

[36] For discussion of the controversial term Imam, see M. Fischer, ‘Imam Khomeini: Four Levels of Understanding’, in J. Esposito, ed., Voices of Resurgent Islam, New York 1983, p. 164; and S. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, New York 1988, p. 101.

[37] R. Wright, reviewing S. Arjomand’s The Turban for the Crown, claims that in the revolution people ‘rose to demand less freedom and fewer material things’. See the book-review section of the New York Times, 10 December 1989.

[38] A. Khomeini, Matn-e Kamel-e Vasiyatnameh-e Elahi va Siyasi-e Imam Khomeini (The Complete Text of Imam Khomeini’s Divine Will and Testament), Kayhan-e Hava’i, 14 June 1989.

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